y would be a dangerous
example to her own enormous colonial system, from which she yearly
drew so great subsidies. If England with her navy should fail, what
could Spain achieve? In the introductory chapter it was pointed out
that the income of the Spanish government was drawn, not as a light
tax upon a wealthy sea power, built upon the industry and commerce of
the kingdom, but from a narrow stream of gold and silver trickling
through a few treasure-ships loaded with the spoils of colonies
administered upon the narrowest system. Spain had much to lose, as
well as to gain. It was true still, as in 1760, that she was the power
with which England could war to the greatest advantage. Nevertheless,
existing injuries and dynastic sympathy carried the day. Spain entered
upon the secretly hostile course pursued by France.

To this explosive condition of things the news of Burgoyne's surrender
acted as a spark. The experience of former wars had taught France the
worth of the Americans as enemies, and she was expecting to find in
them valuable helpers in her schemes of revenge; now it seemed that
even alone they might be able to take care of themselves, and reject
any alliance. The tidings reached Europe on the 2d of December, 1777;
on the 16th the French foreign minister informed the commissioners of
Congress that the king was ready to recognize the independence of the
United States, and to make with them a commercial treaty and
contingent defensive alliance. The speed with which the business was
done shows that France had made up her mind; and the treaty, so
momentous in its necessary consequences, was signed on the 6th of
February, 1778.

It is not necessary to give the detailed terms of the treaty; but it
is important to observe, first, that the express renunciation of
Canada and Nova Scotia by France foreshadowed that political theory
which is now known as the Monroe doctrine, the claims of which can
scarcely be made good without an adequate sea-force; and next, that
the alliance with France, and subsequently with Spain, brought to the
Americans that which they above all needed,--a sea power to
counterbalance that of England. Will it be too much for American
pride to admit that, had France refused to contest the control of the
sea with England, the latter would have been able to reduce the
Atlantic seaboard? Let us not kick down the ladder by which we
mounted, nor refuse to acknowledge what our fathers felt in their hour