tory of the whole war were yet to grace the English flag in the
West Indies; but with the events at Yorktown the patriotic interest
for Americans closes. Before quitting that struggle for independence,
it must again be affirmed that its successful ending, at least at so
early a date, was due to the control of the sea,--to sea power in the
hands of the French, and its improper distribution by the English
authorities. This assertion may be safely rested on the authority of
the one man who, above all others, thoroughly knew the resources of
the country, the temper of the people, the difficulties of the
struggle, and whose name is still the highest warrant for sound,
quiet, unfluttered good-sense and patriotism.

The keynote to all Washington's utterances is set in the "Memorandum
for concerting a plan of operations with the French army," dated July
15, 1780, and sent by the hands of Lafayette:--

"The Marquis de Lafayette will be pleased to communicate the
following general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier
de Ternay, as the sentiments of the underwritten:

"I. _In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive
naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental
principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must
ultimately depend._"

This, however, though the most formal and decisive expression of
Washington's views, is but one among many others equally distinct.
Thus, writing to Franklin, December 20, 1780, he says:--

"Disappointed of the second division of French troops [blockaded
in Brest], but more especially in the expected naval
superiority, which was the pivot upon which everything turned,
we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign after a
flattering prospect at the opening of it.... Latterly we have
been obliged to become spectators of a succession of detachments
from the army at New York in aid of Lord Cornwallis; while our
naval weakness, and the political dissolution of a large part of
our army, put it out of our power to counteract them at the
southward, or to take advantage of them here."

A month later, January 15, 1781, in a memorandum letter to Colonel
Laurens, sent on a special mission to France, he says:--

"Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon
these coasts is the object most interesting. This would
instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive.