t and on the west flank within
two hundred yards, and on the north within half a mile. There was
nothing to prevent this right flank of the French, including the line
of ships, being enfiladed and crushed by the English ships taking
position west of Rose Island. The essential points of close range and
superior height were thus possible to the English fleet, which
numbered twenty to the enemy's seven. If successful in destroying the
shipping and reducing Rose Island, it could find anchorage farther up
the bay and await a favorable wind to retire. In the opinion of a
distinguished English naval officer of the day,[155] closely familiar
with the ground, there was no doubt of the success of an attack; and
he urged it frequently upon Rodney, offering himself to pilot the
leading ship. The security felt by the French in this position, and
the acquiescence of the English in that security, mark clearly the
difference in spirit between this war and the wars of Nelson and
Napoleon.

It is not, however, merely as an isolated operation, but in relation
to the universal war, that such an attempt is here considered. England
stood everywhere on the defensive, with inferior numbers. From such a
position there is no salvation except by action vigorous almost to
desperation. "It is impossible for us," wrote with great truth the
First Lord of the Admiralty to Rodney, "to have a superior fleet in
every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great
line, as you do, and consider the king's whole dominions under their
care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their
point against us."[156] Attacks which considered in themselves alone
might be thought unjustifiable, were imposed upon English commanders.
The allied navy was the key of the situation, and its large
detachments, as at Newport, should have been crushed at any risk. The
effect of such a line of action upon the policy of the French
government is a matter of speculation, as to which the present writer
has no doubts; but no English officer in chief command rose to the
level of the situation, with the exception of Hood, and possibly of
Howe. Rodney was now old, infirm, and though of great ability, a
careful tactician rather than a great admiral.

The defeat of Graves and subsequent surrender of Cornwallis did not
end the naval operations in the western hemisphere. On the contrary,
one of the most interesting tactical feats and the most brilliant
vic