... Indeed,
it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force
in this country, if we had the command of the seas to interrupt
the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This
superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert
the war into a vigorous offensive. With respect to us it seems
to be one of two deciding points."

In another letter to the same person, then in Paris, dated April 9, he
writes:--

"If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical
posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she
attempt it hereafter.... Why need I run into detail, when it may
be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and
that now or never our deliverance must come? How easy would it
be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made
to comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior
fleet always in these seas, and France would put us in condition
to be active by advancing us money."

Ships and money are the burden of his cry. May 23, 1781, he writes to
the Chevalier de la Luzerne: "I do not see how it is possible to give
effectual support to the Southern States, and avert the evils which
threaten, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas." As the
season for active operations advances, his utterances are more
frequent and urgent. To Major General Greene, struggling with his
difficulties in South Carolina, he writes, June 1, 1781: "Our affairs
have been attentively considered in every point of view, and it was
finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, in preference to
a Southern operation, as we had not decided command of the water." To
Jefferson, June 8: "Should I be supported in the manner I expect, by
the neighboring States, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the
necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to
support New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being
expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and should we,
by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a naval superiority,
their ruin would be inevitable.... While we remain inferior at sea ...
policy dictates that relief should be attempted by diversion rather
than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress,"
that is, to the South. To Rochambeau, June 13: "Your Excellency will
recollect that New York was looked upon by us as the