windward and so attack it on both sides; but the commander of that
division, a prince of the blood royal, did not obey, and the possible
advantage was lost. On the English side the same manoeuvre was
attempted. The admiral of the van and some of his ships tacked, as
soon as out of fire (D),[124] and stood after the French rear; but for
the most part the damage to rigging prevented tacking, and wearing was
impossible on account of the ships coming up behind. The French now
stood to leeward and formed line again, but the English were not in
condition to attack. This was the end of the battle.

It has been said that there are some interesting points about this
resultless engagement. One is, that Keppel's conduct was approved
throughout, on oath before the court-martial, by one of the most
distinguished admirals England has brought forth, Sir John Jervis, who
commanded a ship in the fleet. It does not indeed appear what he could
have done more; but his lack of tactical understanding is shown by a
curious remark in his defence. "If the French admiral really meant to
come to action," says he, "I apprehend he would never have put his
fleet on the contrary tack to that on which the British fleet was
approaching." This remark can only proceed from ignorance or
thoughtlessness of the danger to which the rear of the French fleet
would have been exposed, and is the more curious as he himself had
said the English were lying up for it. Keppel's idea seems to have
been that the French should have waited for him to come up abreast,
and then go at it, ship for ship, in what was to him the good old
style; D'Orvilliers was too highly trained to be capable of such
action.

The failure of the Duc de Chartres,[125] commanding the French van
during the firing, to wear in obedience to orders, whether due to
misunderstanding or misconduct, raises the question, which is still
debated, as to the proper position for a naval commander-in-chief in
action. Had D'Orvilliers been in the van, he could have insured the
evolution he wished. From the centre the admiral has the extremities
of his fleet equally visible, or invisible, as it may be. At the head
he enforces his orders by his example. The French toward the end of
this war solved the question by taking him out of the line altogether
and putting him on board a frigate, for the avowed reasons that he
could thus better see the movements of his fleet and of the enemy
without being blinded by smok