ar. His words, which probably reflect the current opinion of his
service in that day, as they certainly do the policy of French
governments, call for more than passing mention, as they involve
principles worthy of most serious discussion:--

"The French navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or
preserving a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps, but
actually less real, of taking a few ships; and in that it has
approached more nearly the true end to be proposed in war. What
in fact would the loss of a few ships matter to the English? The
essential point is to attack them in their possessions, the
immediate source of their commercial wealth and of their
maritime power. The war of 1778 furnishes examples which prove
the devotion of the French admirals to the true interests of the
country. The preservation of the island of Grenada, the
reduction of Yorktown where the English army surrendered, the
conquest of the island of St. Christopher, were the result of
great battles in which the enemy was allowed to retreat
undisturbed, rather than risk giving him a chance to succor the
points attacked."

The issue could not be more squarely raised than in the case of
Grenada. No one will deny that there are moments when a probable
military success is to be foregone, or postponed, in favor of one
greater or more decisive. The position of De Grasse at the Chesapeake,
in 1781, with the fate of Yorktown hanging in the balance, is in
point; and it is here coupled with that of D'Estaing at Grenada, as
though both stood on the same grounds. Both are justified alike; not
on their respective merits as fitting the particular cases, but upon a
general principle. Is that principle sound? The bias of the writer
quoted betrays itself unconsciously, in saying "a few ships." A whole
navy is not usually to be crushed at a blow; a few ships mean an
ordinary naval victory. In Rodney's famous battle only five ships were
taken, though Jamaica was saved thereby.

In order to determine the soundness of the principle, which is claimed
as being illustrated by these two cases (St. Christopher will be
discussed later on), it is necessary to examine what was the advantage
sought, and what the determining factor of success in either case. At
Yorktown the advantage sought was the capture of Cornwallis's army;
the objective was the destruction of the enemy's organized military
force on shor