hould be sent to Cap Francais; the coolness
with which he kept Graves amused until De Barras's squadron had
slipped in, are all points worthy of admiration. The French were also
helped by the admiral's power to detain the two hundred
merchant-ships, the "West India trade," awaiting convoy at Cap
Francais, where they remained from July till November, when the close
of operations left him at liberty to convoy them with ships-of-war.
The incident illustrates one weakness of a mercantile country with
representative government, compared with a purely military nation. "If
the British government," wrote an officer of that day, "had
sanctioned, or a British admiral had adopted, such a measure, the one
would have been turned out and the other hanged."[152] Rodney at the
same time had felt it necessary to detach five ships-of-the-line with
convoys, while half a dozen more went home with the trade from
Jamaica.

It is easier to criticise the division of the English fleet between
the West Indies and North America in the successive years 1780 and
1781, than to realize the embarrassment of the situation. This
embarrassment was but the reflection of the military difficulty of
England's position, all over the world, in this great and unequal war.
England was everywhere outmatched and embarrassed, as she has always
been as an empire, by the number of her exposed points. In Europe the
Channel fleet was more than once driven into its ports by overwhelming
forces. Gibraltar, closely blockaded by land and sea, was only kept
alive in its desperate resistance by the skill of English seamen
triumphing over the inaptness and discords of their combined enemies.
In the East Indies, Sir Edward Hughes met in Suffren an opponent as
superior to him in numbers as was De Grasse to Hood, and of far
greater ability. Minorca, abandoned by the home government, fell
before superior strength, as has been seen to fall, one by one, the
less important of the English Antilles. The position of England from
the time that France and Spain opened their maritime war was
everywhere defensive, except in North America; and was therefore, from
the military point of view, essentially false. She everywhere awaited
attacks which the enemies, superior in every case, could make at their
own choice and their own time. North America was really no exception
to this rule, despite some offensive operations which in no way
injured her real, that is her naval, foes.

Thus situate