ion. It
was nowhere expected that the French would bring nearly the force they
did; and Graves lost information, which he ought to have received, as
to their numbers, by the carelessness of his cruisers stationed off
the Chesapeake. These had been ordered to keep under way, but were
both at anchor under Cape Henry when De Grasse's appearance cut off
their escape. One was captured, the other driven up York River. No
single circumstance contributed more to the general result than the
neglect of these two subordinate officers, by which Graves lost that
all-important information. It can readily be conceived how his
movements might have been affected, had he known two days earlier that
De Grasse had brought twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail of the line;
how natural would have been the conclusion, first, to waylay De
Barras, with whom his own nineteen could more than cope. "Had Admiral
Graves succeeded in capturing that squadron, it would have greatly
paralyzed the besieging army [it had the siege train on board], if it
would not have prevented its operations altogether; it would have put
the two fleets nearly on an equality in point of numbers, would have
arrested the progress of the French arms for the ensuing year in the
West Indies, and might possibly have created such a spirit of discord
between the French and Americans[150] as would have sunk the latter
into the lowest depths of despair, from which they were only
extricated by the arrival of the forces under De Grasse."[151] These
are true and sober comments upon the naval strategy.

In regard to the admiral's tactics, it will be enough to say that the
fleet was taken into battle nearly as Byng took his; that very similar
mishaps resulted; and that, when attacking twenty-four ships with
nineteen, seven, under that capable officer Hood, were not able to get
into action, owing to the dispositions made.

On the French side De Grasse must be credited with a degree of energy,
foresight, and determination surprising in view of his failures at
other times. The decision to take every ship with him, which made him
independent of any failure on the part of De Barras; the passage
through the Bahama Channel to conceal his movements; the address with
which he obtained the money and troops required, from the Spanish and
the French military authorities; the prevision which led him, as early
as March 29, shortly after leaving Brest, to write to Rochambeau that
American coast pilots s