ction with less exposure.

None of these did he do. As regards the first, he, knowing the
criticisms of the fleet, wrote home that his line was too much
disordered to allow it. Whatever the technical irregularity, it is
difficult to believe that, with the relative power of motion in the
two fleets, the attempt was hopeless. The third alternative probably
presented the greatest advantage, for it insured the separation
between the enemy's main body and the crippled ships, and might very
probably exasperate the British admiral into an attack under most
hazardous conditions. It is stated by English authorities that Byron
said he would have borne down again, had any attack been made on them.
At three P.M. D'Estaing tacked all together, forming line on the lee
ship,[136] and stood to the southward again. The English imitated
this movement, except the van ship "Monmouth" (a'), which being too
badly hurt to manoeuvre kept on to the northward, and the three
separated ships. Two of these (c') kept on north and passed once more
under the French broadsides; but the "Lion" (c''), unable to keep to
the wind, kept broad off before it across the bows of the enemy, for
Jamaica, a thousand miles away. She was not pursued; a single
transport was the sole maritime trophy of the French. "Had the
admiral's seamanship equalled his courage," wrote the celebrated
Suffren, who commanded the French van ship, "we would not have
suffered four dismasted vessels to escape." "D'Estaing, at the age of
thirty, had been transferred from the army to the navy with the
premature rank of rear-admiral. The navy did not credit him with
nautical ability when the war broke out, and it is safe to say that
its opinion was justified by his conduct during it."[137] "Brave as
his sword, D'Estaing was always the idol of the soldier, the idol of
the seaman; but moral authority over his officers failed him on
several occasions, notwithstanding the marked protection extended to
him by the king."[138]

Another cause than incapacity as a seaman has usually been assigned by
French historians for the impotent action of D'Estaing on this
occasion. He looked upon Grenada, they say, as the real objective of
his efforts, and considered the English fleet a very secondary
concern. Ramatuelle, a naval tactician who served actively in this war
and wrote under the Empire, cites this case, which he couples with
that of Yorktown and others, as exemplifying the true policy of naval
w