the general situation, the ships first in action
will not be greatly outnumbered, or subjected to overpowering
concentration before support comes up, or when there is probability
that the enemy may escape unless promptly struck. This was not so
here. Nor should the "Cornwall," "Grafton," and "Lion" have been
permitted to take a course which allowed, almost compelled, the enemy
to concentrate rather than diffuse his fire. The details of the affair
are not precise enough to warrant more comment than naming these
mistakes, without necessarily attributing them to fault on the part of
the admiral.

The French had up to this time remained strictly on the defensive, in
accordance with their usual policy. There was now offered an
opportunity for offensive action which tested D'Estaing's professional
qualities, and to appreciate which the situation at the moment must be
understood. Both fleets were by this on the starboard tack, heading
north (B, B, B), the French to leeward. The latter had received little
injury in their motive power, though their line was not in perfect
order; but the English, owing to the faulty attack, had seven ships
seriously crippled, four of which--the "Monmouth" (a'), "Grafton,"
"Cornwall" (c'), and "Lion" (c'')--were disabled. The last three, by
three P.M., were a league astern and much to leeward of their line,
being in fact nearer the French than the English; while the speed of
the English fleet was necessarily reduced to that of the crippled
ships remaining in line. These conditions bring out strongly the
embarrassments of a fleet whose injuries are concentrated upon a few
ships, instead of being distributed among all; the ten or twelve which
were practically untouched had to conform to the capabilities of the
others. D'Estaing, with twenty-five ships, now had Byron to windward
of him with seventeen or eighteen capable of holding together, but
slower and less handy than their enemies, and saw him tactically
embarrassed by the care of a convoy to windward and three disabled
ships to leeward. Under these circumstances three courses were open to
the French admiral: (1) He might stretch ahead, and, tacking in
succession, place himself between Byron and the convoy, throwing his
frigates among the latter; (2) He might tack his fleet together and
stand up to the English line to bring on a general action; or (3) he
could, after going about, cut off the three disabled ships, which
might bring on a general a