West India Islands
required, first, a powerful seaport, which the French had; second, the
control of the sea. For the latter it was necessary, not to multiply
detachments in the islands, but to destroy the enemy's navy, which may
be accurately called the army in the field. The islands were but rich
towns; and not more than one or two fortified towns, or posts, were
needed.

It may safely be said that the principle which led to D'Estaing's
action was not, to say the least, unqualifiedly correct; for it led
him wrong. In the case of Yorktown, the principle as stated by
Ramatuelle is not the _justifying_ reason of De Grasse's conduct,
though it likely enough was the _real_ reason. What justified De
Grasse was that, the event depending upon the unshaken control of the
sea, for a short time only, he already had it by his greater numbers.
Had the numbers been equal, loyalty to the military duty of the hour
must have forced him to fight, to stop the attempt which the English
admiral would certainly have made. The destruction of a few ships, as
Ramatuelle slightingly puts it, gives just that superiority to which
the happy result at Yorktown was due. As a general principle, this is
undoubtedly a better objective than that pursued by the French. Of
course, exceptions will be found; but those exceptions will probably
be where, as at Yorktown, the military force is struck at directly
elsewhere, or, as at Port Mahon, a desirable and powerful base of that
force is at stake; though even at Mahon it is doubtful whether the
prudence was not misplaced. Had Hawke or Boscawen met with Byng's
disaster, they would not have gone to Gibraltar to repair it, unless
the French admiral had followed up his first blow with others,
increasing their disability.

Grenada was no doubt very dear in the eyes of D'Estaing, because it
was his only success. After making the failures at the Delaware, at
New York, and at Rhode Island, with the mortifying affair at Sta.
Lucia, it is difficult to understand the confidence in him expressed
by some French writers. Gifted with a brilliant and contagious
personal daring, he distinguished himself most highly, when an
admiral, by leading in person assaults upon intrenchments at Sta.
Lucia and Grenada, and a few months later in the unsuccessful attack
upon Savannah.

During the absence of the French navy in the winter of 1778-79, the
English, controlling now the sea with a few of their ships that had
not gone to t