longed to different political parties; they made
charges, one against the other, and in the following courts-martial
all England divided, chiefly on party lines. Public and naval
sentiment generally favored the commander-in-chief, Keppel.

[Illustration: Pl. IX. KEPPEL OFF USHANT JULY 27, 1778.]

Tactically, the battle presents some interesting features, and
involves one issue which is still living to-day. Keppel was to leeward
and wished to force an action; in order to do this he signalled a
general chase to windward, so that his fastest ships might overtake
the slower ones of the enemy. Granting equal original fleet-speed,
this was quite correct. D'Orvilliers, to windward, had no intention of
fighting except on his own terms. As will generally be the case, the
fleet acting on the offensive obtained its wish. At daybreak of the
27th both fleets were on the port tack, heading west-northwest, with
a steady breeze at southwest (Plate IX., A, A, A).[121] The English
rear (R) had fallen to leeward,[122] and Keppel consequently made
signal to six of its ships to chase to windward, so as to place them
in a better position to support the main body if it could get into
action. D'Orvilliers observed this movement, and construed it to show
an intention to attack his rear with a superior force. The two fleets
being then from six to eight miles apart, he wore his fleet in
succession (French A to B), by which he lost ground to leeward, but
approached the enemy, and was able to see them better (Positions B, B,
B). At the completion of this evolution the wind hauled to the
southward, favoring the English; so Keppel, instead of going about,
stood on for half an hour more (English B to C), and then tacked
together in wake of the French. This confirmed D'Orvilliers'
suspicions, and as the wind, which certainly favored the English that
morning, now hauled back again to the westward, permitting them to lay
up for the French rear, he wore his fleet together (B to C), thus
bringing the rest to aid the rear, now become the van, and preventing
Keppel from concentrating on or penetrating it. The two fleets thus
passed on opposite tacks (C),[123] exchanging ineffective broadsides,
the French running free to windward and having the power to attack,
but not using it. D'Orvilliers then made the signal for his van,
formerly the rear, to wear to leeward of the English rear, which was
to leeward of its own main body, intending himself to remain to