ht not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue
is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a
virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of
the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,
since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring
in connection with dangers of death (which also is something
difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it
consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so
far as necessity requires.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is
found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is
not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise.
Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures
of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life:
such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long
endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long
time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the
contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these
passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one
who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect
virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be
taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take
perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue
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