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table to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just." _I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual," wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still. Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals. Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels. Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice. _______________________ QUESTION 142 OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (In Four Articles) We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether insensibility is a sin? (2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin? (3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity; (4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices? _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1] Whether Insensibility Is a Vice? Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2, 3): "In those days Da
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