tion 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue.
For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore
honesty is not the same as virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,
since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40,
"Let all things be done decently (_honeste_) and according to order"
among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are
omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has
_honestas_]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth.
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides
honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also
divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.
_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through
being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad
2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged
chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17.
Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as
virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those
things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such
as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only
for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive
to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable
for their own sake: where
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