s name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject,
though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a
man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her
mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in
body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of
its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency." He
also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue
which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer
any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is
it possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues
that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other
virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as
he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices
not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."
Reply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it
is reckoned among the fruits.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2]
Whether Chastity Is a General Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf.
A. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised
by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the
appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
Obj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication
seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72
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