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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 1]

Whether Continence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For
species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.
But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for
instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing
it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful,
but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith,
modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from
things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a
virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus]
that "continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore
continence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ The word "continence" is taken by various people in
two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from
all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity
(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the
first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies
to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated
above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires,
which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes
continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way
continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to
wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it
be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature
of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to
reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in
the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)
that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has
something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for an