n to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and
in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in
relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be
said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in
themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of
nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as
being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding
that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor
and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general
sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a
restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of
the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and
incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.

Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it
regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a
child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent
[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 3]

Whether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence,
as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
pertain to the concupiscible power. There