fore continence is in the
concupiscible power.
Obj. 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ.
viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions
overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to
reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.
Obj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason,
or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it
follows that it is in the concupiscible.
_On the contrary,_ Every virtue residing in a certain power removes
the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil
act of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
not in the concupiscible power.
_I answer that,_ Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible
as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both,
since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and
each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow
his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to
be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to
vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason;
whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his
reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of
the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures
of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is
in the concupiscib
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