re
due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not
a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain
negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2]
Whether Incontinence Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But
the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of
divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.
3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155,
A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first,
because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord
with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is
censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from
reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil
desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered,
properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply;
for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his
desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.
155, A. 2, ad 3). In t
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