ich is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest
things.
Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation
which is necessary in all virtues.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]
Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward
actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to
other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty
be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it
will not be concerned with inward passions.
Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining
to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about
things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual
virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and
concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it
cannot be about all these things.
_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all
of them.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where
restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that
present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various
opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of
good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the
province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is
clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a
special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from
modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remainin
|