lieved the demon to have spoken truly.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 2]
Whether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.
Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was
the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and
evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to
the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by
coveting God's likeness.
Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled
them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin
consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would
seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible.
But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying
of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?"
Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps.
68], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,"
says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost
happiness."
_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first
parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God;
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated;
unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every
good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first
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