ssary for the body's sustenance. In the
second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to
intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly
to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be
sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not
directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful
consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country,
if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from
some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou,
having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become
foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is
directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to
lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is
directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately
intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity
of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible
truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
virtuous.
Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the
use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to
Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory,
soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of
these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust
of experiment and knowledge."
Reply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man
prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such
sights make men adulterers and shameless.
Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into
them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order
to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for
our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if h
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