directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to
knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by
that which removes an obstacle.
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QUESTION 167

OF CURIOSITY
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?

(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1]

Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about
intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are
essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:
because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being
reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the
human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection
consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot
be about intellective knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord
God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things
that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues
of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to
God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13),
and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore
however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.
Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity
cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.

Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them:
for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of
the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philos