f the present life.
Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the
first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all
future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties
are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on
account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen
held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom.
9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also
contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118,
A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but
either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is
something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often
punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for
the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to
wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take
pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.
Reply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil
of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling
man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely
as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore
Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,
except in so far as it is a punishment.
Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the
wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous
make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is
that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good,
while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore
inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them
meritorious.
Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the
privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the
privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of
sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting
the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may
speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as
being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has
no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including
the previous alteration
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