gh things immoderately; and
this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the
mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things
according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is
evident that humility is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so
called because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis"_ [*Literally, "bent
to the ground"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen
in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when
one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus
Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord,
whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue.
Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, "not
understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and
becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).

Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs
and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine
says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to
wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however,
this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,
properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does
not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the
mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great
things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.

Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature
nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To
Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only
as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be
perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature