le), but its business with them is to resist them.
For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of
one thing against another.

Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible,
and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the
reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible.
Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover,
and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong
immediately to the will as their proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their
subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it
is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4]

Whether Continence Is Better Than Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater
the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for
it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned, except he
strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to
vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater
virtue than temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is
in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is
a greater virtue than temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus
[*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to
a principal virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater
than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what
we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity
over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be
taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when
they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far
greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its
p