is
about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which
is about pleasures of the palate.
Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as
regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which
judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as
regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though
they regard the one sense.
Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more
oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint,
since if one consent to them this increases the force of
concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine
says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those
bodily contacts which belong to the married state."
Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the
maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to
pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there
is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of
the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are
essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by
their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue
which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 4]
Whether Purity Belongs Especially to Chastity?
Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to
chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
Obj. 2: Further, _pudicitia_ (purity) is derived from _pudor,_ which
is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide
Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all
sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the
other virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would
seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of repro
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