apital vices are said to be the cause of
others.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were
treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all
sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
Reply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly
through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,
so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 5]
Whether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every
sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not
be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated
above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to
fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter
of lust.
Obj. 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the
origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Obj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards
their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of
the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely
the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
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