, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we
stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity,
as stated.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 3]
Whether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue
from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,
one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the
same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate
which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity
is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of
intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of
temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are
the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.
Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to
wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are
neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their
complicity in vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not
distinct virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons "chastity"
together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate
to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix,
4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food
whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically
from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the
nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which
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