akes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest
and beautiful.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to
Ezech. 28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast
lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 3]

Whether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore
the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good:
for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be
useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): "The honest is
that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies
reference to something else."

_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the
useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as
stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it
has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever
is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to
man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue
(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing
may be