becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason.
A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects
his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is
referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly
the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.
Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest
as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest
to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas
the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).
Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its
own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in
accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is
desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.
Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion
of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the
instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible
with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it
is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with
reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with
regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every
useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4]
Whether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and
whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of
honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore
honesty is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes
all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in
which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to
intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now
"it is the j
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