points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1]
Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is
proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence,
since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part
of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of
fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and
aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is
about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is
the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness,
a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the
support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices
are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._
ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from
many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is
a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in tw
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