e among whom
we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in
detail.

Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected
with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
look upon our defect as disgraceful.

Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm
they do by making many think ill of us.

Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us
more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in
one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more
disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom
we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be,
is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our
request, or by failing to become their friends.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 4]

Whether Even Virtuous Men Can Be Ashamed?

Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness
are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's
forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous
are more inclined to be ashamed.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

Obj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.
Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

Obj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a
"virtuous man is not shamefaced."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of
some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because
one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not diff