hem, and to control the desire for them, and because
their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or
cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is
the agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact
that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident,
for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire
for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is
more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a
more principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,
wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite
with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8]

Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for
being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest
of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.
Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch
than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a
greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these
occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than
fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than
fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the
"greatest virtues are those which are most profi