pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death,
which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous
sin than intemperance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.
_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,
to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving
life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire
of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because,
as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain
annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures.
Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the
part of the object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the
more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who
are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of
death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive
of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the
graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than
cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions
done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are
simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an
intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary
generically. For
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