pleasures.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of
moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only
in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever
pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about
desires and pleasures.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not
occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii,
and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and
desire are kept under control."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we
were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive
appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it
flies from sensible and bodily evils.
The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing
to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through
being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when
a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany
the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of
reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying
from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very
nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz.
fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with
daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining
some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,
is c
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