rance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a
most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is
ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a
certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4),
wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute
of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who
has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is
most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring
most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]

Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is
not only about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear,
especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires
and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and
dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems
that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and