[II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]

Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper
to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,
which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which
regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4),
temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human
life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste
rather than about those proper to the touch.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about
things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, "the touch is
the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the
taste rather than about the touch.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do
with the taste."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human
life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters
certain things are to be considered as principal and others as
secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary
means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the
species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the
preservation of the individual: while the very use of these
necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the
use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a
pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly
about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of
these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the
touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about
pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the