ccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose
perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance
as a part of fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3,
4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been
stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because
it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance
of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay
in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise:
nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends
not only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the
mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.
Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in
common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more
in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the
difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethi