nths of Russia's
exports were blocked by the closing of the Straits; their reopening
would afford not only access to her vast stores of foodstuffs,
but an entry--infinitely more convenient than Vladivostok or
Archangel--for munitions and essential supplies. The Balkan States
were wavering. In Turkey there was a strong neutral or pro-Ally
sentiment. Victory would give an enormous material advantage, help
Russia in the impending German drive on her southwestern frontier,
and bolster Allied prestige throughout the eastern world.

Faced with the problem, the Admiralty sent an inquiry to Admiral
Carden, in command on the scene, as to the practicability of forcing
the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, assuming that old ships
would be employed, and "that the importance of the results would
justify severe loss." He replied on January 5: "I do not think the
Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended
operations with a large number of ships." In answer to further
inquiries, accompanied by not altogether warranted assurance from
the First Lord that "High authorities here concur in your opinion,"
Admiral Carden outlined four successive operations:

(a) The destruction of defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

(b) Action inside the Straits, so as to clear the defenses up to
and including Cephez Point battery N8.

[Illustration: THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE]

(c) Destruction of defenses of the Narrows.

(d) Sweeping of a dear channel through the mine-field and advance
through the Narrows; followed by a reduction of the forts further
up, and advance into the Sea of Marmora.

This plan was presented at a meeting of the British War Council
on January 13. It may be noted at this point that the War Council,
though composed of 7 members of the Cabinet, was at this time dominated
by a triumvirate--the Premier (Mr. Asquith), the Minister of War
(General Kitchener), and the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.
Churchill); and in this triumvirate, despite the fact that England's
strength was primarily naval, the head of the War Office played a
leading role. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher) and one or two
other military experts attended the Council meetings, but they were
not members, and their function, at least as they saw it, was "to
open their mouths when told to." Staff organizations existed also
at both the War Office and the Admiralty, at the latter consisting
of the First Lord, First Sea Lord