with torpedo heads, carefully testing
the result every time. We tested the possibility of weakening the
force of the explosion by letting the explosive gases burst in
empty compartments without meeting any resistance. We ascertained
the most suitable steel for the different structural parts, and
found further that the effect of the explosion was nullified if
we compelled it to pulverize coal in any considerable quantity.
This resulted in a special arrangement of the coal bunkers. We
were then able to meet the force of the explosion ... by a strong,
carefully constructed steel wall which finally secured the safety
of the interior of the ship."
The only German armored ship that succumbed to the blow of a single
torpedo was the _Pommern_, an old vessel, built before the fruits
of these experiments were embodied in the German fleet. The labor
of von Tirpitz was well justified by the results, as may be seen
by the instantaneous fashion in which the three British battle
cruisers went to the bottom, compared with the ability of the German
battle cruisers to stand terrific pounding and yet stay afloat and
keep going. According to the testimony of a German officer,[1] the
_Luetzow_ was literally shot to pieces in the battle and even then
it took three torpedoes to settle her. Actually she was sunk by
opening her seacocks to prevent her possible capture. The remarkable
ability of the battle cruiser _Goeben_, in Turkish waters, to survive
shell, mines, and torpedo, bears the same testimony, as does the
_Mainz_, which, in the action of the Heligoland Bight had to be
sunk by one of her own officers, as in the case of the _Luetzow_.
It is possible that Jellicoe assumed an inferiority of the British
armor piercing shell because of this power of the German ships to
stay afloat. But photographs published after the armistice showed
that British shells penetrated the 11-inch turret armor of the
_Seydlitz_ and the 13-inch of the _Derfflinger_ with frightful
effect. The difference was in the fact that they did not succeed
in sinking those ships, which, after all is the chief object of a
shell, and this must be attributed to better under-water construction.
[Footnote 1: Quoted in _Naval and Military Record_, Dec. 24, 1919,
p. 822.]
The only criticism it seems possible to suggest on Scheer's tactics
is the unwariness of his pursuit, which might so easily have led
to the total destruction of the German fleet. Strangely enough,
although
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