eutral, no Allied naval superiority could have saved France from
destruction by the combined armies of Germany and Austria, just
as the Grand Fleet was powerless to check the conquest or deny
the possession of Belgium. It must be borne in mind that a land
power has the advantages of central position and interior lines, and
the interior lines of to-day are those of rail and motor transport,
offering facilities for a rapid concentration on any front.

Of course, modern life and modern warfare are so complex that few
nations are able to live and wage war entirely on their own resources;
important communications extend across the sea. In this respect
the United States is singularly fortunate. With the exception of
rubber, every essential is produced in our country, and the sea
power that would attempt to strangle the United States by a blockade
on two coasts would find it unprofitable even if it were practicable.
A hostile navy would have to land armies to strike directly at the
manufacturing cities near the seaboard in order to affect our
communications. In brief, sea power is decisive just so far as
it cuts the enemy's communications.

Finally in considering sea power we should note the importance
of coordinating naval policies with national. The character of a
navy and the size of a navy depend on what policy a nation expects
to stand for. It is the business of a navy to stand behind a nation's
will. For Great Britain, circumstances of position have long made
her policy consistent, without regard to change of party. She had
to dominate the sea to insure the safety of the empire. With the
United States, the situation has been different. The nation has
not been conscious of any foreign policy, with the single exception
of the Monroe Doctrine. And even this has changed in character
since it was first enunciated.

At the present day, for example, how far does the United States
purpose to go in the Monroe Doctrine? Shall we attempt to police
the smaller South and Central American nations? Shall we make the
Caribbean an area under our naval control? What is to be our policy
toward Mexico? How far are we willing to go to sustain the Open Door
policy in the Far East? Are we determined to resist the immigration
of Asiatics? Are we bound to hold against conquest our outlying
possessions,--the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska?
Shall we play a "lone hand" among nations, or join an international
league? Until there