is some answer to these questions of foreign
policy, our naval program is based on nothing definite. In short,
the naval policy of a nation should spring from its national policy.

On that national policy must be based not only the types of ships
built and their numbers, but also the number and locale of the
naval bases and the entire strategic plan. In the past there has
been too little mutual understanding between the American navy and
the American people. The navy--the Service, as it is appropriately
called--is the trained servant of the republic. It is only fair to
ask that the republic make clear what it expects that servant to
do. But before a national policy is accepted, it must be thought
out to its logical conclusion by both the popular leaders and naval
advisers. As Mahan has said, "the naval officer must be a statesman
as well as a seaman." Is the policy accepted going to conflict
with that of another nation; if so, are we prepared to accept the
consequences?

The recent history of Germany is a striking example of the effect
of a naval policy on international relations. The closing decade
of the 19th century found Great Britain still following the policy
of "splendid isolation," with France and Russia her traditional
enemies. Her relations with Germany were friendly, as they always
had been. At the close of the century, the Kaiser, inspired by
Mahan's "_Influence of Sea Power on History,_" launched the policy
of a big navy. First, he argued, German commerce was growing with
astonishing rapidity. It was necessary, according to Mahan, to have
a strong navy to protect a great carrying trade. This von Tirpitz[1]
emphasizes, though he never makes clear just what precise danger
threatened the German trading fleets, provided Germany maintained a
policy of friendly relations with England. Secondly, Germany found
herself with no outlet for expansion. The best colonial fields had
already been appropriated by other countries, chiefly England. To
back up German claims to new territory or trading concessions, it
was necessary to have a strong navy. All this was strictly by the
book, and it is characteristic of the German mind that it faithfully
followed the text. "_Unsere Zukunft_," cried the Kaiser, "_liegt
auf dem Wasser!_" But what was implied in this proposal? A great
navy increasing rapidly to the point of rivaling that of England
could be regarded by that country only as a pistol leveled at her
head. England wou