n unable to reach their proper station
in the van.

Thirdly, if conditions for night battle were too risky why did
the Grand Fleet fail to keep sufficient touch with the enemy by
means of its light flotillas so as to be informed of his movements
and prevent his escape? There were frequent contacts during that
short night, and the Germans were sighted steering southeast. The
attacks made by British destroyers certainly threw the German line
into confusion, and some of the light vessels were driven to the
north, reaching German bases by way of the Baltic. Nevertheless
the fleet succeeded in cutting through without serious loss. To
this there seems to be no answer.

Lastly, to the query why Jellicoe did not seek another action in
the morning, as originally intended, he replies that he discovered
by directional wireless that the Germans were already safe between
the mine fields and the coast, and that he could not safely proceed
without his screening force of destroyers and light cruisers, which,
after their night operations, were widely scattered. From German
accounts, however, we find no mention of a shelter behind mine
fields, but astonishment at the fact that they were permitted to go
on their way unmolested. Morning found the two fleets only twenty
miles apart, and the Germans had a half day's steaming before they
could reach port. They were in no condition to fight. The battleship
_Ostfriesland_ had struck a mine and had to be towed. The battle
cruiser _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to keep her from sinking, and
other units were limping along with their gun decks almost awash.

Certainly the tactics of Jellicoe do not suggest those of Blake,
Hawke, or Nelson. They do not fit Farragut's motto--borrowed from
Danton[1]--"l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace," or
Napoleon's "frappez vite, frappez fort." War, as has been observed
before, cannot be waged without taking risks. The British had a
heavy margin to gamble on. As it happened, 23 out of the entire 28
battleships came out of the fight without so much as a scratch on
their paint; and, after deployment, only one out of the battle line
of 27 dreadnoughts received a single hit. This was the _Colossus_,
which had four men wounded by a shell.

[Footnote 1: And borrowed by Danton from Cicero.]

The touchstone of naval excellence is Nelson. As Mahan has so ably
pointed out, while weapons change principles remain. Dewey, in
deciding to take the chances involv