nd the British
flotillas also were painted the battleship gray.

Naturally the failure of the superior fleet to crush the inferior one
aroused a storm of criticism, the most severe emanating from English
naval writers. The sum and substance is the charge of overcaution
on the part of the British Commander in Chief. It is held that
Jellicoe should have formed his battle line on his starboard instead
of his port wing, thus turning toward the enemy and concentrating
on the head of their column at once. Forming on the port division
caused the battle fleet to swerve away from the enemy and open
the range just at the critical moment of contact, leaving Beatty
unsupported in his dash across the head of the enemy's line. It
is said that the latter even sent a signal to the _Marlborough_
for the battleships to fall in astern of him, and the failure to
do so made his maneuver fruitless. Apparently this message was
not transmitted to the flagship at the time. In answer Jellicoe
explains in great detail that the preliminary reports received
from Goodenough and others as to the position of the High Seas
Fleet were so meager and conflicting that he could not form line
of battle earlier than he did, and secondly that deploying on the
starboard division at the moment of sighting the enemy would have
thrown the entire battle fleet into confusion, blanketed their
fire, and created a dangerous opening for torpedo attack from the
destroyers at the head of the German column. On this point Scheer
agrees with the critics. Deploying on the starboard division instead
of the port, he says, "would have greatly impeded our movements and
rendered a fresh attack on the enemy's line extremely difficult."

The second point of criticism rested on the turning away of the
battleships at the critical point of the torpedo attack at 7.20,
under cover of which the German battleships wheeled to westward and
disappeared. Jellicoe's reply is that if he had swung to starboard,
turning toward the enemy, he would have headed into streams of
approaching torpedoes under conditions of mist and smoke that were
ideal for torpedo attack, and if he had maintained position in line
ahead he would have courted heavy losses. In connection with this
turn he calls attention to the fact that British light cruisers and
destroyers could not be used to deliver a counter attack because,
on account of the rapid changes of course and formation made by the
battlefleet, they had bee