ed in a night entry of Manila
Bay did so in answer to his own question, "What would Farragut
do?" Hence in considering Jutland one may take a broader view than
merely a criticism of tactics. In a word, does the whole conduct
of the affair reveal the method and spirit of Nelson?

At Trafalgar there was no need for a deployment after the enemy
was sighted because in the words of the famous Memorandum, "the
order of sailing is to be the order of battle." The tactics to
be followed when the French appeared had been carefully explained
by Nelson to his commanders. No signal was needed--except the fine
touch of inspiration in "England expects every man to do his duty."
In brief, the British fleet had been so thoroughly indoctrinated,
and the plan was so simple, that there was no room for hesitation,
uncertainty, or dependence on the flagship for orders at the last
minute. It is hard to see evidence of any such indoctrination of
the Grand Fleet before Jutland.

Again, Nelson was, by example and precept, constantly insisting
on the initiative of the subordinate. "The Second in Command will
... have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
destroyed.... Captains are to look to their particular line as
their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor
perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his
ship alongside that of an enemy." At Jutland, despite the urgent
signals of Beatty at two critical moments, neither Burney of the
sixth division nor Jerram of the first felt free to act independently
of the orders of the Commander in Chief. The latter tried, as Nelson
emphatically did not, to control from the flagship every movement
of the entire fleet.

Further, if naval history has taught anything it has established
a point so closely related to the responsibility and initiative
of the subordinate as to be almost a part of it; namely, a great
fleet that fights in a single rigid line ahead never achieves a
decisive victory. Blake, Tromp, and de Ruyter fought with squadrons,
expecting--indeed demanding--initiative on the part of their flag
officers. That was the period when great and decisive victories
were won. The close of the 17th century produced the "Fighting
Instructions," requiring the unbroken line ahead, and there followed
a hundred years of indecisive battles and bungled opportunities. Then
Nelson came and