revived the untrammeled tactics of the days of Blake
with the added glory of his own genius. It appears that at Jutland
the battleships were held to a rigid unit of fleet formation as in
the days of the Duke of York or Admiral Graves. And concentration
with a long line of dreadnoughts is no more possible to-day than
it was with a similar line of two-decked sailing ships a century
and a half ago.

Finally, in the matter of spirit, the considerations that swayed
the movements of the Grand Fleet at all stages were apparently
those of what the enemy might do instead of what might be done
to the enemy, the very antithesis of the spirit of Nelson. It is
no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander in Chief
that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships.
The existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the
Allied cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging
on its use. But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the
British fleet exist merely to maintain a numerical preponderance
over its enemy or to crush that enemy--whatever the cost? If the
battle of Jutland receives the stamp of approval as the best that
could have been done, then the British or the American officer of
the future will know that he is expected primarily to "play safe."
But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson, the
men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors
of the British Empire.

Thus the great battle turned out to be indecisive; in fact, it
elated the Germans with a feeling of success and depressed the
British with a keen sense of failure. Nevertheless, the control of
the sea remained in the hands of the English, and never again did
the High Seas Fleet risk another encounter. The relative positions
at sea of the two adversaries therefore remained unaltered.

On the other hand, if the British had destroyed the German fleet
the victory would have been priceless. As Jervis remarked at Cape
St. Vincent, "A victory is very essential to England at this hour."
The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in Allied prospects. The Verdun
offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the
Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians
had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation
of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic
suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of th