a Zeppelin hovered over the British fleet at dawn of the
day after the battle, no aircraft of any kind scouted ahead of the
Germans the day before. In pursuing Beatty, Scheer had to take
a chance, well aware that if the Grand Fleet were within reach,
Beatty's wireless would bring it upon him. But Scheer was evidently
perfectly willing to risk the encounter. Such criticism as arose in
Germany--from Captain Persius, for example--centered on "Tirpitz's
faulty constructional methods"; which, in the light of the facts
of the battle would seem to be the very last thing to hit upon.

As for types and weapons it is clear that the armored cruisers
served only as good targets and death traps. The British would
have been better off if every armored cruiser had been left at
home. The dominating feature of the story is the influence of the
torpedo on Jellicoe's tactics. It is fair to say that it was the
Parthian tactics of the German destroyer, both actual and potential,
that saved the High Seas Fleet and robbed the British of a greater
Trafalgar. At every crisis in the battle it was either what the
German destroyer did or might do that governed the British commander's
maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather
than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers
might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost
all contact with their enemy for the rest of the battle, it was
because of a destroyer attack. At this time eleven destroyers
accomplished the feat of driving 27 dreadnoughts from the field!
Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril
of destroyer attacks under cover of darkness, and finally Jellicoe
decided not to risk an action the following morning because his
capital ships had no screening forces against the torpedo of the
enemy. It is worth noting in this connection that although the
Admiralty were aware of the battle in progress, they held back the
Harwich force of destroyers and light cruisers which would have
proved a welcome reenforcement in pursuing the retreating fleet.
The reason for this decision has never been published.

In connection with the important part played by the German destroyers
at Jutland it is worth remarking that before the war it was the
Admiralty doctrine that destroyers could not operate successfully
by day, and they were accordingly painted black for night service.
The German destroyers were painted gray. After Jutla