h practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle
cruisers was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.

At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser
Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported
that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave
its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned
his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering
Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right
about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers
as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about
fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point
used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept
on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet
and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the
commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his
frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same
time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect
in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing
seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a
difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was
trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.

_The Second Phase_

The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance
force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation
was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead
the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly
he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper
had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.
Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the
five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, assisted
by the two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The
other two battleships engaged the head of the advancing German
battle fleet at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they
could make out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently
neither side scored on the other.

As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of
Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid
being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The
mistiness increased to such a degree that